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Abstract
The transnational communities, or in other terms, the migrant communities who
went to the US and the UK, or to any other European states had strong belief in
their religion in which they might not be contaminated by the secular ideology in
the Western countries. In this respect, the phenomenology of religion in interna-
tional relations is a relatively new and surprising. Accordingly, this paper aims at
investigating the implications of the emergence of trans-national religious groups
for international relations. The paper will argue that the rise of trans-national
religious groups has produced a profound impact on international relations. The
factors that influenced this transformation in international relations is the con-
temporary processes of globalization which scholars argue, are pivotal to bring-
ing religion to the centre stage of international relations. In order to deepen the
understanding of this process, two case scenarios will be analyzed, namely, the
Sikh Diasporas and the imagined Islamic community, the umma. In this paper, it
has been argued that the rise of trans-national religious actors may affect state
sovereignty in one way or another. Under secular ideology, the role of religion is
marginalized from the public sphere, in particular, the domain of politics and
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religion is being obviously separated. This separation, according to both groups,
is problematic. It is therefore, the emergence of Islamic and Sikh communities is
considered by some liberal democratic countries like India as a peril to its state
sovereignty. In Islamic doctrines, the Muslims hold a principle in din wa dawla,
the unity of state and religion, while in Sikhism, the Sikhs have to trust miri and
piri, the unification of religious and political institution.
Masyarakat transnasional atau dalam terma lain disebut juga sebagai masyarakat
migran yang menetap di Amerika dan Inggris, atau ke negara-negara Eropa
lainnya memiliki keyakinan yang kuat terhadap agama mereka dan tidak
terkontaminasi oleh ideologi sekuler Barat. Pada konteks ini, fenomenologi agama
dalam perspektif hubungan internasional merupakan kajian baru dan menarik
untuk dibahas. Berdasarkan hal tersebut, makalah ini bertujuan untuk menyelidiki
implikasi dari munculnya kelompok trans-nasional tersebut terhadap kajian
hubungan internasional. Makalah ini berasumsi bahwa munculnya kelompok sosial
keagamaan yang bersifat trans-nasional berdampak besar terhadap hubungan
internasional. Faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi perubahan ini adalah proses
globalisasi yang menarik agama ke dalam pola hubungan internasional. Untuk
lebih jelasnya, dua skenario kasus akan dianalisis, yaitu Diaspora Sikh dan konsepsi
‘keummatan’ dalam Islam. Dalam pembahasan makalah ini, didapati bahwa
munculnya kelompok masyarakat trans-nasional dapat mengancam kedaulatan
suatu negara dalam berbagai bentuknya. Dalam ideologi sekuler, peran agama
termarjinalkan dari ruang publik, khususnya ranah politik. Pemisahan ini, menurut
kedua kelompok tersebut, memiliki sejumlah permasalahan. Oleh karena itu,
munculnya masyarakat transnasional Islam dan Sikh dianggap oleh beberapa
negara demokrasi liberal seperti India sebagai ancaman bagi kedaulatan negara.
Dalam perspektif Islam, prinsip din wa dawlah merupakan konsepsi kesatuan
negara dan agama, sementara dalam ajaran Sikhisme, doktrin miri piri, merupakan
konsepsi penyatuan lembaga keagamaan dan politik.
Keywords: Transnational religious groups; Sikh diaspora; Umma;
State sovereignty
Introduction
This study focuses on how trans-national religious communities have
emerged as a critical juncture in reforming a new feature of interna-
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tional politics. Religion along with its systems of belief was not only
having no significant role in international politics for many years, but
also being separated from the study of statecraft. The 1648 Westphalia
treaty had been a point of departure for establishing the idea of secu-
larism in European countries; that is, restricting the function of religion
within the state.1 This restriction did not stay any longer until the late of
the 20th century. Religion, nonetheless, begun to involve in state politics
in many ways, and hence, had been effective means to express reli-
gious symbols and aspirations. The transnational communities, or in
other terms, the migrant communities who went to the US and the
UK, or to any other European states had strong belief in their religion in
which they might not be contaminated by the secular ideology in the
Western countries. In this respect, the phenomenology of religion in
international relations is a relatively new and surprising.
The post-Westphalia international politics takes into consideration
the vital role of state sovereignty, unchallenged until the arrival of
globalization in the 1980s.2 Globalization, nevertheless, has generated
new socio-political spectrum for transnational actors as well as chal-
lenges for the state and its citizens alike. In this sense, the transnational
actors have benefited from globalization to advance the cause of
deterritorialized religious nationalism.3 Accordingly, the globalization pro-
cess of 1980s connected with the change of economic, social and
political domains is resulted from the rise of a global social space, where
1Scott M.Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International
Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century, New York: Palgrave MacMillan,
2005, 33.
2J. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, Harlow, Essex: Pearson
Longman, 2007, 31.
3Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International
Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century. New York: Palgrave MacMillan,
2005, 29.
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borderless interactions and interdependencies develop between per-
sons.4 On this level, there is a strive between the forces of globalization
and the local assertions of identity and culture. The space for ethnicity
in world politics is being contested as a matter of right by the diasporic
ethnicity. In short, the globalization process as a main force of impact
affects the new politics of space, culture and identity of diasporic com-
munities as the embodiment of the post modern world.5
In addition, the transnational civil society, in its new face, consists of
individuals, groups and organizations in different countries that work
together across borders in pursuance of common goals.6 In line with
this, religious affiliations provide a connection to homogenous religious
groups and sentimental resources to people who adhere to religio-
political community and an identity they can take pride in.7 At the same
time, the new sociopolitical forms of engagement brought about by the
slow transformation of the old into the new have redefined the social
and political conventions associated with the nation-state.8 The new
order has undermined many of the traditional pillars of a secular nation-
state. In short, the concepts like national sovereignty, economic au-
tonomy, and socio-religious identity have all undergone changes. In
the light of these changes, the paper will analyze the ever-changing
genre of relationship between the state and the transnational religious
groups producing a profound change in international relations.
4L. Gayer, The Globalization of Identity Politics: The Sikh Experience. May, 2002, 2 available
from <http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org> , accessed on 2 April 2009.
5L. Gayer, The Globalization of Identity Politics…, 3.
6J. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, Harlow, Essex: Pearson
Longman, 2007, 47.
7G. Shani, “A Revolt against the West: Politicized Religion and the International Order-A
Comparison of the Islamic Umma and the Sikh Qaum”, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of Interna-
tional Studies, Vol.1 (2002), 29.
8J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin,  “The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules
of Sovereignty in International Relations”,  International Organization, Vol.48, No.1 (1994), 110.
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This paper aims at investigating the implications of the emergence
of trans-national religious groups for international relations. The paper
will argue that the rise of transnational religious groups has produced a
profound impact on international relations. The factors that influenced
this transformation in international relations is the contemporary pro-
cesses of globalization which scholars argue, are pivotal to bringing
religion to the centre stage of international relations.9 In order to deepen
the understanding of this process, two case scenarios will be analyzed,
both are the uniqueness of Sikh Diasporas and the rise of a so-called
imagined Islamic community, the umma. In the paper, it has been
argued that the rise of trans-national religious actors may affect state
sovereignty in one way or another.
This paper is outlined in three parts. In the first part, clarification of
some definitional issues regarding the topic is presented. Next, some
literatures will be reviewed, followed by questioning the rationale behind
the rise of trans-national religious group on the global level. Afterwards,
two case studies are discussed and analyzed, and the last is conclusion.
Transnational actors: some definitional aspects
By way of classification, according to Scott M. Thomas, there are
three kinds of religious non-state actors namely sub-state actors,
transnational actor, and inter-governmental organizations.10
First is a sub-sate actor. In Thomas’ view, sub-state actors may be
called sub-national actors work as local interest groups or the ones who
sometimes pressure the government in a state on the purpose of
9F. Petito and P. Hatzopoulos. Religion in International Relations: Towards a De-secularised
Transnational Civil Society? The Return from Exile, New York: Palgrave, 2003.
10Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of Interna-
tional Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century, New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2005, 99-105.
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having influence on its national or international policy. In the West,
these groups are under big and legal institutions representing religious
diversity on the local level. In terms of its resource mobilization, they
get a huge amount of funding from variety of sources such as govern-
ment, international donations, and so on; it depends on the link be-
tween the church and the state. To mention but some, Catholic Bish-
ops’ Conference in England or Wales, Evangelical Alliance in the UK,
Jews Board of Deputies in England, or Muslim Council in Great Britain
are evident in this category.11
The second type is trans-national actors. This group of people, as
Thomas observes, are out of state’s control either by its policy in
national or international level or event by international institutions albeit
they are closely connected with international links.12 Based on their
interests, this group can be separated into two forms notably profit
oriented companies like MNCs or multinational corporations, and non-
profit oriented organizations such as Non-Government organizations or
NGOs. All religious NGOs are included in non-profit organizations For
instance, Oxfam, a Methodist minister, a Jewish Rabbi, and CARE which
was established by American Quakers.13
The last category is Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs). Well
known as a kind of international organizations, the members of IGOs
are local governments. With regards to their functions, IGOs can be
either nationally or regionally linked such as Arab leagues, the European
Union, WTO, and NATO. By comparison, some religious IGOs are
distinct in character. For example, the Organization of the Islamic Con-
11Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of Interna-
tional Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century, New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2005, 99.
12Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion…, 100.
13Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion…, 101.
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ference (OIC) recruits its members on the basis of religions not states,
and envisions its members the notion of establishing the Umma to
unify Islamic community beyond its state boundaries.14
By definition, a transnational religious actor, as suggested by Shani,
could be considered as a non-governmental individual or a group with
specific religious affiliations having connections with an actor in another
country or with an international organization.15 In addition, Haynes ob-
serves that this group is intended to affect international politics using a
so-called soft power which in Joseph Nye’s opinion prone to be direct
and often cultural or ideological influences and encouragement.16
The rise of transnational religious actors: a threat to state
sovereignty?
Transnational religious actors, once having founded in position of its
impact, tend to mobilize themselves as a global transnational civil soci-
ety. In Lipschultz’s view, a transnational civil society is as a conse-
quence of a self-conscious construction of networks of knowledge and
action, by decentred, local actors, that cross the reified boundaries of
space as though they were not there.17 In many ways, a globalized
transnational civil society, as suggested by Shani, has a strong connec-
tion among its members of non-state actors albeit they are from vari-
ous religious backgrounds because they share commonalities in terms
of economical or political interests to assist each others to face the
14Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion…, 103-104.
15G. Shani, Towards a De-secularized Transnational Civil Society? Transnational Religious
Actors and International Relations, 2007, 8. Paper presented at panel on ‘Religion, Soft power
and International Relations’, SGIR Conference, Torino, September, 12-15 2007. available from
<http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Shani-sgir_2007_(shani).pdf> accessed on 2 April 2009.
16Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, Harlow, Essex: Pearson
Longman, 2007, 40.
17R. Lipschultz, “Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society”,  Millen-
nium, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1992), 390.
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wave of secularism.18 In Gramscian perspective, as cited by Shani,
such a construct of civil society may be considered as counter-hege-
monic because this can be another option to the idea of a secularized
liberal model of global civil society.19
The transnational religious groups, even though living as ‘migrant
citizens or non-citizens’ such as British born Pakistan or India are sub-
ject to national policy in the country of residence, but at the same time
they are connected with some religious allegiances along with political
tendency to certain ethnic community outside of the state territory.
Sikhism, for example, is a good case in this point. The concept of
transnationalism, according to Mirdal, tends to be suprastatal member-
ships, identities and loyalties, a condition beyond the usual state-bound
national identities.20 Accordingly, in terms of its socio-cultural dynamics,
transnationalism mirrors social, cultural, and economic links which are
between, above or beyond the nation state.21 Trans-nationalism, hence,
as process which has resulted in increasing contacts among people on
the global scale. As a consequence, trans-migrants shaping their iden-
tities in the countries they live in are automatically and naturally af-
fected by norms and values from their countries of origin as well as the
environment of their countries of residence. In this sense, it is obvious
18G. Shani, Towards a De-secularized Transnational Civil Society? Transnational Religious
Actors and International Relations, 2007, 7. Paper presented at panel on ‘Religion, Soft power
and International Relations’, SGIR Conference, Torino, September, 12-15 2007.available from
<http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Shani-sgir_2007_(shani).pdf> accessed on 2 April 2009.
19M. Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War, Cambridge: Polity, 2003, cited in G. Shani,
“Towards a De-secularized Transnational Civil Society? Transnational Religious Actors and Inter-
national Relations”, 2007, 8, paper presented at panel on ‘Religion, Soft power and International
Relations’, SGIR Conference, Torino, September, 12-15, 2007, available from <http://
archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Shani-sgir_2007_(shani).pdf>,  accessed on 2 April 2009.
20G. Mirdal and  L. Ryynanen-Karjalainen M, Migration and Trans-cultural Identities, European
Science Foundation (ESF) Forward Look Report 2 (2004), 7.
21R. Grillo, “Islam and Trans-nationalism”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 30, No.
5 (2004).
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that globalization in many ways affect people and their construction of
identity in terms of culture, ways of life, world views, and faith.
According to Haynes, trans-national actors, either religious or non-
religious ones, are suspected to affect state sovereignty. By this he
means a state independence from overt interference by another state
or states.22 Quoting Philpott, Haynes observes that the discourse on
sovereignty in the study of international relations is almost missing due
to its excessive focus on the notion of secularism. Haynes gives a very
good example of the relations between Islam and Christianity long
before the improvement of the current international system. He ar-
gues that the phenomenology of religious transnational movement nowa-
days is not ‘de novo’ but has its vital historical roots.23
Consider this example. Dating back to the seventh century, Islam
was born in Arabian Peninsula, expanded successfully to other regions
such as Africa, Asia, and Europe (including Balkans and Iberian areas)
to establish a sort of pan-Islamism, the umma, that is an imagined
Islamic global society. In the process of its rapid expansion, Islam was
challenged by unified European countries and failed to exist as an
Islamic empire within the European states.24 In this respect, the state
sovereignty of European polities was actually in peril due to the rise of
the umma albeit it did not succeed in imposing its religious governmen-
tal system namely sharia.
22J. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, Harlow, Essex: Pearson
Longman, 2007, 128.
23D. Philpott, “The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations”, World
Politics 55 (2002), 66-95,  cited in  J. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and
Religion, Harlow, Essex: Pearson Longman, 2007, 129.
24J. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, Harlow, Essex: Pearson
Longman, 2007, 129.
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By contrast, different from the umma, Christendom tells another
story. In the light of history, Christendom is considered ‘no longer
exists.25 In the early period of Christianity, Christendom was deemed
as a general theory of ‘universal norms and laws’ stemmed from God
which was becoming fundamental doctrines of just war theories.26 In
its development, around sixteenth century, the trans-national wide-
spread of Christianity was brought by Spanish and Portuguese con-
querors in search for gold and natural resources from South America
to the Caribbean and some countries in Asia. In short, Christendom
was mainly associated with European expansion through the founda-
tion of European colonies. While religion has been marginalized from
the public sphere in Europe and other countries, international relations
have been improved in the way the global order was formed and
mixed by other secular ideologies like nationalism, communism, and
liberal democracy.27
However, in his analysis, Haynes does not clarify the hazards of the
so-called transnational religious actors for state sovereignty of a coun-
try like Europe in detail.28 Two case studies provided, the Umma and
Christendom, denotes only the significance of historical facts regarding
the issue of state sovereignty in international relations. Here, two im-
portant questions emerge: Are all transnational religious actors poten-
tially harming state sovereignty? How do transnational religious actors
25B. Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, The Atlantic Monthly (September 1990), 52-60 cited
in J. Haynes,  An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, Harlow,  Essex: Pearson
Longman,  2007, 129-130.
26C. Dolan,  In War We Trust: The Bush Doctrine and the Pursuits of Just War, Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2005,  cited in J. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion,
Harlow, Essex: Pearson Longman, 2007, 129.
27J. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, Harlow, Essex: Pearson
Longman, 2007, 129-130.
28J. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations…, 130.
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endanger state sovereignty of a country? To answer these questions,
some theories of state sovereignty are needed, followed by compara-
tive analysis of two other case studies: the imagined Umma and the
Sikh Diaspora.
Quoting Weber’s definition, Barkin and Cronin see sovereignty within
the study of international relations in two distinctive features of entities:
state sovereignty and nation sovereignty.29 While state sovereignty is
associated with the border lines of a countries upon which have to be
controlled by the legitimate governments, nation sovereignty is consid-
ered as communities of sentiment forging the political lines of an au-
thoritative state. Here, the difference between sovereignty of states
and nations seems obvious using this theoretical framework. Nonethe-
less, on the perspective of liberal interdependence literature, there are,
at least, three obstacles regarding this basic theory.30
First is the problem of state control. According to Thomson, sover-
eignty is basically not about state control, but about state authority.31
Correspondingly, Thomson poses a provocative question concerning
this issue stating that
“…whether or not the state’s ability to make authoritative political
decisions has eroded; that is, whether ultimate political authority has
shifted from the state to non-state actors or institutions”.32
In other questions, does a state have a legitimate authority to
control trans-national religious actors in this category? Put it simply, do
29J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin,  “The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the
Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations”,  International Organization, Vol. 48, No.1 (1994),
110-111.
30Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap be-
tween theory and Empirical Research”,   International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39 (1995), 216.
31Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations …, 216.
32 Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of Interna-
tional Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century, New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2005, 216.
IJIMS, Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 2, Number 2, December  2012: 165-190
176
trans-national religious actors really endanger state sovereignty? If so,
in what way?
The second problem is about a criterion of functionalism. Under this
category, the state and sovereignty are responsible to serve societal
needs like economic growth and protection from military attack.33 Nev-
ertheless, there are a few literatures to strengthen this view. As a
matter of fact, to mention some, study by Strayer, Tilly or Gidden
emphasizes that the state’s function is to wage a war and to build
power against other states and society.34 In response with this, Tho-
mas objects that
“… it is a-historical to suggest that states are losing control, that
sovereignty is eroding, because states cannot now fulfill functions
they never had, or have assumed only recently”.35
If so, what about a state policy regarding the rise of Islamic funda-
mentalism in pursuits of Islamic umma? In other words, is this policy
intended to protect citizens of a state from military attacks of militant
Islam? I take it as a challenge to this liberal interdependence view on
relations between state and sovereignty in accordance with the issue
of Islamic radicalism and terrorism.
The last is about a logical explanation on the links between sover-
eignty and interdependence. There are no clear arguments to support
regarding this issue. Instead, Thomson asks
“…Is increasing interdependence the cause of declining sovereignty
or vise versa? That is, are interdependence linkages reducing the
state’s ability to control its borders, or is the state’s declining ability
33Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations…, 216.
34Strayer,  1970, cited in Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations:
Bridging the Gap between theory and Empirical Research”,  International Studies Quarterly, Vol.
39 (1995), 216.
35Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap be-
tween theory and Empirical Research”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 39 (1995), 216.
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to control its borders, presumably due to technological develop-
ments, facilitating the proliferation of ties of interdependence?”36
In the case of Sikh Diaspora, this problem is significant to clarify. For
instance, is there a strong connection between, say, British sover-
eignty and interdependence of Sikhs in the UK and in the Punjab as
their homeland? To be precise, will the increase of Sikhs’ interdepen-
dence decline British sovereignty or vise versa? The answer to this
obstacle seems not clear too.
The imagined umma and the Sikh diaspora
Transnational religious actors function as an external force on state
sovereignty, and its global aspects provide claims and counterclaims of
empowerment of the immigrant communities. The case studies on the
imagined Umma and the Sikh Diaspora will provide credence to the
analysis of transnational religious groups’ resurgence on the interna-
tional political scene. These two case studies are supposed to answer
some of the questions raised and then further to investigate if these
two case scenarios support the hypothesis that transnational religious
groups, indeed, have affected the international relations. These two
cases will also be analyzed if the rise of trans-national religious actors
influence state sovereignty or not.
Imagined umma: Islamic unity versus state sovereignty
Umma is an Arabic vocabulary, meaning, a community of believers.
This term has something in common with Hebrew, that is, ‘am’ or
people, which according to Halliday both are derived from the same
roots of ‘Aramaic and ‘Akkadian.37 It is also mentioned many times,
36Janice E. Thomson,  “State Sovereignty in International Relations”…, 216.
37Fred Halliday, “The Politics of the Umma: States and Community in Islamic Movements”,
Mediterranean Politics, Vol.7, No.3 (2002), 23.
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approximately 62 times, in the Quran, a Muslims’ holy book, and often
cited in the Hadith, the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and traditions.
In the course of Islamic history, this word had been associated with
the notion of ‘khulafa’ or ‘successors,’ in the early period of Islamic
empire up until the fall of the Caliphate, an Islamic governmental sys-
tem, in 1924.38 In the recent time, it has been connected to the
imagination of creating ‘khilafa’ or a sort of Islamic state based on
shari’a or Islamic laws. Borrowing Benedict Anderson’s terminology,
Imagined Community, in this paper, I would call umma as an Imagined
Islamic community, that is, a faithful community the Muslims have in
mind to emerge someday.39
In its broader sense, the term umma may also be meant diversities
for two arguments. First, referring to Islamic story, it did not necessar-
ily reflect a mere Islamic term regarding system of belief, but it was
also a sort of constitution managing religious diversities where Jews in
Medina in the time of the Prophet Muhammad were under protection
of Islamic empire. Second, the issue of plurality and diversity are men-
tioned in the Quran in Sura or chapter 10:9 “People were once a single
umma, but they differed”, followed by “I created peoples and tribes so
that they should get to know each other”.40
In the early Islamic period, it was in the Prophet Muhammad’s life
time, the term umma was used to describe the people of Madina
including Muslims, Jews, and Pagan under Islamic government, but
then it was limited to Muslim community only. By contrast, in the light
of traditional Islamic literature, the so-called umma was deemed both
38Fred Halliday, “The Politics of the Umma”…,  23.
39Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nation-
alism, revised edition. 1st ed. 1983. London: Verso, 1991.
40Fred Halliday, “The Politics of the Umma”…, 24.
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in positive and negative impression; it related to either religious or tribal
groups. In addition, in the early medieval time, the term then com-
prised social status or other groups of people, albeit it connoted im-
mensely the ‘Arab nation.41
In the next development of umma, for hundreds of years, it had
been articulated in two forms of Islamic polity namely the caliphate and
the sultanate, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. Even
though religious doctrines were not intended to manage Islamic laws
with politics, or precisely to distinguish between religion and politics,
some theories of politics proposed by ulama or Islamic scholars justi-
fied the forms of Islamic empire like the caliphate and the sultanate.
Ironically, they were often waging wars against each others.42
It was around the nineteenth century, the notion of umma had
been developed as modern political community. According to Jamal al-
Din al-Afghani, a proponent of Islamic revival and Moslem politician
devoted to work in the Ottoman empire, in Egypt and Iran, umma in
modern age should be seen as a nation like any other modern coun-
tries such as the UK, France, and Germany. Al-Afghani is convinced in
unifying Muslims all over the word under one Islamic polity in order to
achieve a revival of Islamic civilization and a restoration of the essential
solidarity, ta’asub, which binds all communities together.43
From this period onwards, the meaning of umma had been chang-
ing over the time depending on its context. It could be either Muslim
community as a whole or as a part like Arabs, Egyptians, or any other
countries in the Middle East. As a result, there has been a mixture
between religious terms and borders in defining umma. Take for in-
41G.P. Makris, Islam in the Middle East: a Living tradition,  USA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007, 45.
42G.P. Makris, Islam in the Middle East…, 45.
43Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and Hourani, 1962:107-129,  cited in Fred Halliday,
“The Politics of the Umma”…, 26.
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stance, Husain al-Marsafi, the Professor of al-Azhar Islamic University
Cairo, wrote a book entitled “Risalat al-Kalim al-Thaman,” (Tract on
Eight Words), and he considered umma as a community determined
not only by faith but also by territory and language.44
In spite of its various meanings of umma, Muslims all over the world
are inspired by the idea of being bounded together in the global Islamic
society, the umma, and envisioned by theological doctrines in the Quran
and the Hadith. The fundamental Islamic political doctrine says that
religion (din) cannot be divorced from politics (dawla) and that the only
true sovereignty and law are those of God.45 This principle is called din
wa dawla or the unity of religion and state. Correspondingly, Muslim
intellectuals and scholars perceive it differently, even stand in opposi-
tion, regarding the implementation of these doctrines. As a conse-
quence, the understanding of these ideas in the Quran has resulted in
either receiving or refusing secular ideologies like democracy and hu-
man rights, as well as questioning the compatibility of, say, Islam with
democracy or Islam with human rights by Muslim politicians and activ-
ists. This leads to the rise of religion-based polities along with pan-
Islamism and political Islam which encourage Muslims to be unified for
common causes that mirror symbolic strength and communal identity.
In the beginning of twenty first century, this global identity is reflected
via internet and website, and even through engagement in civil society
or may be terrorist networks. The widespread of such Islamic terrorist
links along with their ideals to create a God-fearing Islamic polity, the
caliphate under Shari’a laws, has generated a stereotype of the Islamic
44Husain al-Marsafi, 1881, cited in Fred Halliday, “The Politics of the Umma”…, 26.
45J. L. Esposito and J. O. Voll, “Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue”,  Millennium
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 29, No.  3 (2000), cited in Sara Silvestri, Does Islam
Challenge European Identity? Continuum, Religious Roots of Contemporary European Identity,
Data Standards Ltd, Somerset,  2007, 22.
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umma, and thus suspected to endanger sovereignty of the Western
countries in particular the US and its alliances.46 Jama’a Islamiya in
Southeast Asia and Al-Qaeda in the Middle East are evident to this
case.
The phenomenon of political Islam or in other words Islamism has
been defying the Western imperialism and Westphalian order immensely.
Quoting Esposito and Voll, Shani emphasizes that throughout the Mus-
lim world; Islamic oriented intellectuals have transformed Muslim politi-
cal discourse in ways that are highly visible in both domestic politics and
in international relations.47 Here, the ultimate goal of political Islam is to
re-manage state power in Islamic states based on hakimiyyat Allah or
God’s rule’ intended to found nizam Islami or Islamic governmental
system using shari’a law.48 It is, therefore, a fundamental attachment
not the watan (homeland) but to the umma or community of believ-
ers, all made equal in their submission to Allah.49
Islamic world (al-’alam al-Islami), once it has been imagined as united
umma, would emerge at the center of popular imagination of the dark
history of the Western occupation over the Muslim countries. Consider
this example. After wars in Iraq, Bosnia, Kashmir, and Afghanistan,
Usama Bin Laden conveyed his message to Muslims all over the world
46Sara Silvestri, Does Islam Challenge European Identity? Continuum, Religious Roots of
Contemporary European Identity, Data Standards Ltd, Somerset, 2007, 22-23.
47J. L. Esposito and J. O. Voll, “Islam and the West: Muslim Voices of Dialogue”, Millennium
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2000), 613 cited in G. Shani, “A Revolt against
the West: Politicized Religion and the International Order A Comparison of the Islamic Umma and
the Sikh Qaum”,  Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, Vol.1 (2002), 21.
48Bassam Tibi, “Post-Bipolar Order in Crisis: The Challenge of Politicised Islam”, Millennium:
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2000), 49-50, cited in G. Shani, “A Revolt against
the West: Politicized Religion and the International Order A Comparison of the Islamic Umma and
the Sikh Qaum”,  Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, Vol.1 (2002), 22.
49Castels, 1997, 15, cited in cited in G. Shani, “A Revolt against the West: Politicized Religion
and the International Order A Comparison of the Islamic Umma and the Sikh Qaum”,  Ritsumeikan
Annual Review of International Studies, Vol.1 (2002), 22.
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on 7 October 2001 about 80 years of humiliation and shame. For the
West, Laden’s statement was bias, but for the Muslim World it was
obviously connoted to the 1992 abolition of the Ottoman caliphate.50
The Sikh diaspora
According to Shani, there are three inter-connected considerations in
situating the Sikhs as the focus of analysis. The first consideration is
the Sikhs should be deemed as followers of any other recognized reli-
gions in the world like Islam and Christianity. The second consideration
is the Sikhs should be regarded as a nation along with its territories. The
third consideration is the widespread of Sikhs all over the world should be
seen as diaspora. Unlike the umma, in the case of the Sikh community,
there is no obvious difference between nation and diapora or, say, be-
tween watan (homeland) in Punjab and territory in Khalsa Panth.51
The first consideration is on the acceptance of the Sikhs as followers
of any other recognized religions in the world like Islam and Christianity.
Sikhism as a system of belief comprises teachings and rituals available
in its divine book called “the Guru Granth Shahib,” compiled in a sacred
script especially to the Sikhs gurumukhi in gurdwara, its holy place of
worship. To become a good Sikh, one must be ‘baptized,’ and agree to
perform the Khalsa Rahit or the ethics of sikhs. Afterwards, this bap-
tized sikh called amritdhari has to declare to obey the tenth Guru,
Gobind Singh, to perform the five symbols of the sikh identity namely
kes (hair), kanga (a comb), kachh (knee-length breeces), kara (a
steel bracelet on the right hand), and kirpan (a sword).52
50G.P. Makris, Islam in the Middle East: a Living Tradition,  USA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007, 45.
51G. Shani, “A Revolt against the West: Politicized Religion and the International Order A
Comparison of the Islamic Umma and the Sikh Qaum”,  Ritsumeikan Annual Review of Interna-
tional Studies, Vol.1 (2002), 24.
52Hew McLeod, Who is a Sikh? The Problem of Sikh Identity,  Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1989, 96, cited in Shani, “A Revolt against the West”…, 24.
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The second consideration is on the acknowledgment of the Sikhs as
a nation along with its borders, referring to their homeland in Punjab
India. Sikhism as a nation can be traced from the history of the Khalsa
independence in 1699 from Mughal, British and Indian occupations.
The formal language of the Sikhs is Punjabi as their homeland is the
Punjab. As a political entity, Sikhs have their own parliament called the
Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC). They also have
a unique political party named the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD). The
function of SGPC is to accommodate the Sikhs’ aspiration as well as to
produce a sort of legislation in accordance with their issues and prob-
lems. The main of of SGPC is located in the Akal Takht, a center of
their spiritual and temporal power.53
The third consideration is on the admission of rapid widespread of
Sikhs all over the world as diaspora. As a matter of fact, the overall
population of the Sikhs around the world accounted to around 16 and
17 million,54 but it has been reported that it is increasing significantly to
25 million nowadays.55 In the light of history, despite the fact that the
existing population of Sikh worldwide was as a result of immigration
process after British imperialism in India, the emergence of Sikh migra-
tion beyond South Asia can be found in ways of communication be-
tween Sikh Soldiers and British army during the nineteenth century. In
addition, the independence of India together with the partition of the
Punjab in 1947 had been influencing the increasing number of Sikh
population inside India who supported the post war-Northern Indian
migration to the UK. In Great Britain, they involved in Ramgharia Sikhs
53G. Shani, “A Revolt against the West”…, 25.
54Darshan Singh and Tatla, The Sikh Diaspora: The Search for Statehood, London: UCL Press,
1999, 11,  cited in G. Shani, “A Revolt against the West”…, 27.
55See Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, “Sikh,”  [online] available from  <http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikh#cite_note-0> accessed on 10 April 2009.
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and in political shifts in the East Africa in the late 1970s. Nowadays, it
has been reported that more than half of the global Sikh population has
been living in the UK around 750,000, in Canada accounted to 278,400,
and in the USA about 100,000 people.56
According to Shani, the existence of the Sikh community defies the
global order in two ways. First, it challenges the justification of warfare,
either by using force or violence, by the Indian State against the Punjab.57
The Sikhs in diaspora want the sovereign statehood of the Punjab by
emphasizing their right of self-determination in their homeland, the
Punjab. The separation of Pakistan (1947) and Bangladesh (1971)
from India are evident to this case as it inspired the Sikhs to demand
the partition of the Punjab as well.58
Second, by refusing the sovereign statehood of India and demand-
ing the sovereignty of the Khalsa, the Sikh community defies the
Westphalian global order thoroughly. Due to the fact that there are no
certain borders put on the sovereignty of the Khalsa, it allows the Sikh
political demands to be implemented in the current federal legislation
within India. Here, the SGPC-Akali Dal complex plays an important role
for solving the case of the Khalsa Panth.59
In Hinsley’s view, sovereignty consists of both internal and external
dimensions. On internal level, as Hinsley argues, sovereignty entails
the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the
political community. Conversely, on external level, he suggests, that
political authority will never be there.60 In this sense, the Sikh commu-
56Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, “Sikh,”  [online] available from  <http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Sikh#cite_note-0> accessed on 10 April 2009.
57G. Shani, “A Revolt against the West’…, 28-29.
58Gurharpal Singh and Darshan Sing Tatla, Sikhs in Britain: The Making of Community,  London:
Zed Books Ltd., 2006, 20.
59G. Shani, “A Revolt against the West’…, 29.
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nity is deemed as sovereign because the Khalsa Panth had been a
center of all political and spiritual power for the Sikhs. This is reflected in
Hargobind, miri and piri, the twin swords of the sixth Guru, as a symbol
of the concepts of temporal and spiritual sovereignty, and thus emerged
in the form of the Golden Temple complex founded by the Akal Takht
and Harimandir. In Sikh traditions, wearing both sacred swords, miri
and piri, is a prerogative right of the Guru Gobind Sing, but then Gobind
Sing awarded piri (a symbol of spiritual sovereignty) to the Guru Granth
Shahib, and miri (a symbol of temporal sovereignty) by the Kirpan to
the Khalsa Panth announcing the edicts of Raj Karega Khalsa. Here,
the Khalsa shall govern, and thus automatically become sovereign.61
Many argue that globalization has been affecting the conception of
the nation-state in that the borders between nations are obscure, while
the people among nations are interconnected beyond space and dis-
tance. Scholte refers the term globalization as follows:
“[Globalization] is a set of technological processes affecting the world
economy, telecommunications, information technology, travel, and
growing economic interdependence between states and peoples that
is altering our sense of time and space, and is creating the possibility
that the world will become a single social space”.62
However, Steven Krasner is not convinced that sovereignty is being
influenced basically by globalization.63 In response to this skepticism,
60F.R. Hinsley, Sovereignty,  Cambridge: Cambridge University Presscited, 1986,  cited in G.
Shani, “A Revolt against the West’…, 29.
61G. Shani, “A Revolt against the West’…, 29; see also Gurharpal Singh and Darshan Sing
Tatla, Sikhs in Britain: The Making of Community…, 20.
62Scholte, 2000, cited in Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Trans-
formation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century. New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, 29.
63Steven Krasner, 1999: 34 cited in Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and
the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First
Century. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, 30.
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Shani asserts that the recent process of globalization has transformed
the Westhphalian conception of territorialized sovereignty, and that trans-
formation is still in progress. The Sikh Diaspora is evident to this case.64
In the case of Sikh Diaspora, the Sikhs utilize the internet to get in
touch and express their sense of the global unity of all Sikhs, and get
engaged in the politics of homeland, the Punjab. This can be seen on
their websites65 in which the term genocide is stated obviously referring
to the massacre of the Sikhs in India accounted to 250,000 people
were dying in the last two decades.66
Conclusion
In this paper, it has been argued that the rises of trans-national reli-
gious communities like the Islamic umma and the Sikh qaum have
undermined the Westphalian global order. Under secular ideology, the
role of religion is marginalized from the public sphere, in particular, the
domain of politics and religion is being obviously separated. This sepa-
ration, according to both groups, is problematic. Accordingly, the emer-
gence of Islamic and Sikh communities is considered by some liberal
democratic countries like India as a peril to its state sovereignty. In
Islamic doctrines, the Muslims hold a principle in din wa dawla, the unity
of state and religion, while in Sikhism, the Sikhs have to trust miri and
piri, the unification of religious and political institution.
Having compared, both Islamic umma and the Sikh qaum have
some commonalities and differences. Their similarities lie in the fact
that both religio-political communities are imagined in the sense that
they are finite and sovereign. For Muslims, the basic principle of their
64 Giorgio Shani, “Beyond Khalistan? Sikh Diasporic Identity and Critical International Theory”,
Sikh Formations, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2005), 67.
65See http:// www.burningpunjab.com., and  http://and www. Khalistan.com.
66 http:// www.burningpunjab.com., and  http://and www. Khalistan.com.
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identity is not to the watan (homeland), but to the umma. For Sikhs,
wherever they reside in diaspora, the Punjab remains their homeland.
Somewhere in this paper, it has been acknowledged that both the
Muslim umma and the Sikh community had been experiencing the
same thing. It was after the tragedy of 9/11, the Muslims and the
Sikhs were suspected to involve in many terrorist movements around
the world. In the UK, for instance, two Sikh organizations, the interna-
tional Sikh Youth Federation and the Babar Khalsa were put on the
black-list of the twenty two international terrorist groups along with
other Islamic terrorists by the British Home Secretary David Blunkett.67
For both Muslims and the Sikhs, it is a sort of political conspiracy to
pressure them in their homeland.
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